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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JEREMY WILLIAM LOWTHER,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48189-2020

Ada County Case No. CR01-19-31262

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Jeremy William Lowther failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
sentencing him to ten years, with two years determinate, and by relinquishing jurisdiction?
ARGUMENT
Lowther Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
In July of 2019, Jeremy William Lowther battered and attempted to strangle his live-in

girlfriend, Autumn Needham. (PSI, p. 185.) Lowther slapped Autumn with an open hand
following an argument, and pushed her onto a couch and placed his hand around her throat. (PSI,
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p. 185.) Autumn grabbed at Lowther’s neck in an attempt to defend herself, and after about five
seconds, Lowther released her. (PSI, p. 185.) During the confrontation, Autumn sustained a
cigarette burn to her left chest, but did not remember exactly how she was burned. (PSI, p. 185.)
Autumn fled the residence after the conflict. (PSI, p. 185.)
The state charged Lowther with one count of attempted strangulation, and one count of
domestic violence or battery. (R., pp. 21-22.) Lowther pleaded guilty to one count of domestic
violence or battery, and the state agreed to dismiss the attempted strangulation charge. (R., pp. 24,
32-33.) The district court sentenced Lowther to ten years, with two years determinate and retained
jurisdiction. (R., pp. 44-46.) Following a period of retained jurisdiction, the district court
relinquished jurisdiction and credited Lowther with 355 days served. (R., p. 62.) Lowther then
filed a timely appeal. (R., pp. 64-65.)
On appeal, Lowther argues that “the district court abused its discretion when it imposed
this sentence,” and “when it relinquished jurisdiction over him.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 1.) Lowther
has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him to ten years, with
two years determinate, and later relinquishing jurisdiction and crediting Lowther with 355 days
served.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. Where a

sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a clear
abuse of discretion.” State v. Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 447, 451, 447 P.3d 895, 899 (2019) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time
of sentencing that confinement is necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution
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applicable to a given case. Id. at 454, 447 P.3d at 902. “A sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted). “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” State v. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605,
608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2019) (citation omitted).
The decision whether to retain jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of the
district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Lee,
117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). The primary purpose of a district
court retaining jurisdiction is to enable the court to obtain additional information regarding whether
the defendant has sufficient rehabilitative potential and is suitable for probation. State v. Jones,
141 Idaho 673, 677, 115 P.3d 764, 768 (Ct. App. 2005). Probation is the ultimate goal of retained
jurisdiction. Id. There can be no abuse of discretion if the district court has sufficient evidence
before it to conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation. Id.
The decision to place a defendant on probation is a matter within the sound discretion of
the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v.
Reed, 163 Idaho 681, 684, 417 P.3d 1007, 1010 (Ct. App. 2018) (citations omitted). Rehabilitation
and public safety are dual goals of probation. State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 114, 426 P.3d
461, 465 (2018). A decision to deny probation will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if it is
consistent with the criteria articulated in I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278, 61
P.3d 632, 635 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567, 650 P.2d 707, 709 (Ct.
App. 1982)).
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C.

Lowther Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
The sentence imposed is within the statutory limits of I.C. § 18-918(2)(b). The record

shows the district court perceived its discretion, employed the correct legal standards to the issue
before it, and acted reasonably and within the scope of its discretion.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated “in the situation that the defendant struck
the victim, pushed her onto a couch, put his hand on her throat – she did not pass out, but she did
exhibit some physical injuries – alcohol certainly seemed to play a major part in this offense.”
(Tr., p. 26, Ls. 19-24.) The district court acknowledged that Lowther “admitted to being an
alcoholic,” and that “the offense happened also ended up with the victim receiving a cigarette burn,
which is pretty painful.” (Tr., p. 26, L. 25 – p. 27, L. 3.) The district court stated that “it is of
concern to [the district court] that the evaluation does rate [Lowther] as high risk. That certainly
seems consistent with the background that is described in the report.” (Tr., p. 27, Ls. 4-8.) The
district court stated that it’s “particularly concerned about [Lowther’s] 21 adult misdemeanor
convictions. The presentence investigator counted 14 violent offenses, presumably including this
one. [The district court] counted slightly less, but [the district court] counted more than the State
has.” (Tr., p. 27, Ls. 11-15.) The district court stated that “there is such an unusually significant
record at the misdemeanor level of violent offenses for battery, and offenses involving property
damage. And that is pretty significant because that is a longer standing pattern. And it’s quite a
significant pattern.” (Tr., p. 27, Ls. 16-21.) The district court acknowledged that the “first time
you see an offense of violence is way back in 2002, and so it’s not … just something that is new
in the defendant’s life. And … it’s very likely to be connected to a lot of what he observed as a
child.” (Tr., p. 28, Ls. 4-9.)
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The district court stated that “[t]he problem is, all these misdemeanor convictions at some
point should have alerted [Lowther] to make a change to the way he was doing things so that he
wouldn’t keep getting in trouble. And that doesn’t seem … to be what happened.” (Tr., p. 28, Ls.
10-15.) After imposition of the sentence and retaining jurisdiction, the district court stated that
“when a pattern of conduct has gone on this long, it’s going to take more work to change that
direction,” and that it would “consider things like whether this is the amount of probationary time
that is necessary, but [the district court] would like to see how [Lowther] approaches relevant
programming.” (Tr., p. 29, Ls. 8-18.)
At the rider review hearing, the district court noted that the “situation was certainly
considerably worsened by the defendant’s alcoholism, but he had also came before the Court with
an unusual number of battery convictions as an adult, property damage convictions, as well as
NCO violations." (Tr., p. 36, Ls. 8-13.) The district court stated that Lowther “had 21 adult
misdemeanor convictions, 14 violent offenses, and repeatedly violated his probation in those
matters. So he already came before the Court with a lot of red flags waving.” (Tr., p. 36, Ls. 1317.) The district court stated that Lowther “didn’t get hiccups. He got serious multiple infractions,
disobedience to orders. He was angry and hostile. He got major disciplinary offenses, including
an infraction and four written warnings,” and “the basic thing that was revealed by his behavior
was that he can do well in class, but then he doesn’t apply it in real life. He does not apply the
skills that he’s learned.” (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 4-12.) The district court stated Lowther’s problems with
programming “really is another warning sign that things are not in a position where it would be
safe for the public.” (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 14-16.) Furthermore, Lowther “has not shown that he can
progress on the key problems that are bringing him before the Court, even when he is in custody.”
(Tr., p. 37, L. 24 – p. 38, L. 1.)
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Lowther argues that the mitigating factors—acceptance of responsibility and commitment
to addressing his alcoholism—show an abuse of discretion. (Appellant’s brief, p. 3.) Lowther’s
argument does not show an abuse of discretion. Lowther claims that “[a] term of incarceration
will not deter [him] unless he is provided the necessary treatment. And a term of incarceration is
not likely to deter the public generally, as the offense was not planned or thought out.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-4.) Lowther’s extensive criminal history with battery and other violent
offenses, in conjunction with probation he received for many of those convictions, shows that
community supervision and probationary programming have been ineffective in rehabilitating
him. (PSI, pp. 189-197.) A sentence of incarceration is reasonable if necessary to deter a
defendant “from similar or even more severe offenses.” State v. Richards, 127 Idaho 31, 40, 896
P.2d 357, 366 (Ct. App. 1995). Lowther’s long history of violence supports the district court’s
determination that he would be deterred only by incarceration.
Lowther argues that the sentence “cannot be justified by the second objective of criminal
punishment, which is the possibility of rehabilitation,” because “[t]he treatment [he] needs is best
provided in the community, not in a prison.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) Lowther’s violent criminal
history and LSI score of twenty-three, which places him in the moderate-risk category to reoffend,
show Lowther’s risk to the community. (PSI, pp. 189-197, 207.) Community supervision is not
a suitable setting for a violent offender to learn how to understand or manage their triggers.
Lowther’s period of retained jurisdiction, which he did not complete, was the appropriate time and
setting to learn how to manage his anger. (PSI, p. 364.) Lowther received CBI-Substance Abuse
and Aggression Replacement Training. (PSI, pp. 365-368.) A deputy warden from the rider
program stated that “[e]ven after completing ART Mr. Lowther continued to challenge staff. He
was not able to control his anger with authority figures and even inserted himself in a situation in
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order to yell at staff and create conflict.” (PSI, p. 369.) The deputy warden further stated “[g]iven
that he has completed ART and still cannot control his temper staff feel that recommending
probation is not appropriate.” (PSI, p. 369.) The district court was well within its discretion to
conclude that retained jurisdiction, rather than probation, was appropriate, and that Lowther’s
performance on his rider demonstrated he was not a suitable candidate for probation.
Lowther next contends that he “did harm someone he loved, which should not be
minimized, but he is not deserving of a term of incarceration.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) In her
victim impact statement, Autumn stated that “the scariest thing that happened that night, is when
Jeremy had his hands around my neck, started off with one and then he placed two. The trauma I
experienced that night still seems foggy in areas.” (PSI, p. 185.) Autumn stated that Lowther
“needs to understand that when he placed his hands around my neck, he moved into the next level.
If [Lowther] is not careful and doesn’t get the help, [sic] he needs he is very much on his way to
becoming a murderer,” and “[a]ll it would have [taken] was a little more pressure, a tighter squeeze
and he could have killed me.” (PSI, p. 186.) Autumn “wonder[s] if [Lowther] has thought about
the magnitude that he could have killed [her] that night or if he just justifies it because his intent
wasn’t to kill [her]. [She] know[s] he put his hands around [her] neck to gain power over [her].”
(PSI, p. 186.) The harm caused to Autumn by Lowther has deeply affected her physically and
mentally. The sentence of ten years, with two years determinate provides proper punishment to
Lowther for the physical violence he committed to his then-girlfriend.
Lowther argues that the “sentence cannot be justified by the fourth objective of criminal
punishment, which is the protection of society.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) His LSI score of twentythree and violent criminal history shows that Lowther is a risk to the community. (PSI, pp. 189197, 207.) While conducting his rider, Lowther received disciplinary remarks for disobedience to
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orders and abusive or obscene language. (PSI, pp. 366-367.) His inability to manage his anger
shows that he’s not a suitable candidate for community supervision, and execution of the
underlying sentence is an appropriate measure to protect society.
Finally, Lowther argues that the “district court should have suspended [his] sentence and
placed him on probation or given him another opportunity at rider programming.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 6.) Lowther’s numerous opportunities and failures on previous probations, and failure to
complete this rider shows that he’s not amenable to alternative treatment, or community
supervision. Lowther has exhausted the district court’s options, and left the district court with no
other recourse than to execute the underlying sentence. Lowther is not a suitable candidate for
probation, or a second period of retained jurisdiction, and a lesser sentence than that imposed
would depreciate the seriousness of the instant offense. Lowther has failed to show that the district
court abused its discretion by sentencing him to ten years, with two years determinate, and later
relinquishing jurisdiction and crediting Lowther with 355 days served.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 3rd day of June, 2021.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
ZACHARI S. HALLETT
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of June, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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